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The increasing concern over corruption in developing countries has been associated 
with the inability of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) to tackle corruption. The 
ineffectiveness of these ACAs is said to be influenced by several factors including the 
underutilization of forensic accounting in fraud investigation process. This article 
focuses on the identification of these factors and their influences on the adoption of 
forensic accounting by ACAs. This was done through the review of literature and 
proposing a framework for further in-depth research work. The conceptual framework 
highlights the antecedent influence of political will on these factors and their influences 
on the adoption of forensic accounting. The implication is that identifying these factors 
through further in-depth studies will contribute to the insufficient research work on the 
adoption of forensic accounting and help policy makers to enhance the performance of 
these agencies.     
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1.0 Introduction 
Corruption is a fundamental obstacle to economic development.  Extant research 
efforts have  sought to understand the causes, and consequences of corruption (Gould 
& Mukendi, 1989; Treisman, 2000) and anti-corruption measures (Quah, 2013b), 
thereby leading to multiple approaches to curbing corrupt practices (Hanna, Bishop, 
Nadel, Scheffler, & Durlacher, 2011).  However, attention has been directed towards 
the establishment of Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) (Meagher, 2005) due to the 
successes recorded in Asia (Quah, 2009, 2015a) and their failure in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Doig, Watt, & Williams, 2007; Heeks & Mathisen, 2012). The successes and 
failures of these specialized organizations have been associated with institutional 
and contingency factors (Quah, 2015b). Previous research efforts have identified 
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the influences of political will, operational autonomy, comprehensive legislation and 
sufficient resourcing (Meagher, 2005; Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013; Quah, 
2013a). Despite these extant studies on corruption and anti-corruption, little is known 
about the influences of these factors on the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs. 
(Bierstaker, Brody, & Pacini, 2006). What are the institutional and contingency factors 
that influence the adoption of forensic accounting? This article addresses this question 
by reviewing the literature to identify existing gap and to propose a framework for 
further studies. 
The article is divided into five sections. The next section reviews the literature to identify 
possible contextual factors influencing the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs. 
The third section identifies contingency factors and their influences on the adoption 
of forensic accounting. The proposed framework for understanding the influences 
of these factors on the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs is presented in the 
fourth section. The implication of the proposed framework is explained in section five. 
The paper concludes by suggesting the need to conduct further in-depth study on the 
influences of these factors on the adoption of forensic accounting to minimize the level 
of corruption globally, and specifically in developing countries. 
2.0 Review of Related Literature
One of the reasons for the creation of ACAs by most developing countries  is a response 
to donor requirements and domestic reform policies (Heilbrunn, 2004; Persson et al., 
2013). Accordingly, Heilbrunn (2004) argued that the creation of ACAs might be a 
genuine concern about the adverse developmental impact of corruption. In line with this, 
Quah (2009) defined ACAs as specialized organizations established by governments 
for the purpose of minimizing corruption in their respective countries. These 
organizations are distinct from other anti-corruption strategies because of the degree 
of specialization, expertise, autonomy and freedom from corruption (Quah, 2009). 
However, these features exist in the presence of significant government commitment 
in the form of sufficient legal powers, adequate human and financial resources and 
operational autonomy (Doig et al., 2007; Gregory, 2015; Quah, 2015b). Most of 
these preconditions for effective ACAs appear to be absent in most of the developing 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (Doig et al., 2007; Persson et al., 2013). This affects 
their performance by influencing the strategy and structural form (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Okogbule, 2006). Additionally, the performance, strategy and structure of these 
organizations are influenced by institutional factors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) and 
organizational contingencies (Donaldson, 2006). 
2.1 Institutional Factors Affecting Structural form of ACAs
The preceding section pointed out that the effectiveness of ACAs depends on three 
fundamental factors. These are sufficient legislative powers, adequate resourcing 
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and operational autonomy (Quah, 2009). Accordingly, Heilbrunn (2004) argued that 
establishment of ACAs require enabling legislation, competent staff and adequate 
budgetary allocation. The existence of these conditions signifies the presence of political 
will (Brinkerhoff, 2010). 
Political will refers to the commitment of political leaders to minimize the level of 
corruption in their countries. Accordingly, Quah (2009) argued that the commitment 
of political leaders is demonstrated in the existence of comprehensive anti-corruption 
legislation; the independence of ACAs,  provision of sufficient personnel and resources; 
and the impartial enforcement of anti-corruption laws. In other words, the commitment 
of political leaders to initiating and sustaining anti-corruption fight is paramount in 
ensuring effective ACAs (Brinkerhoff, 2010). This, signals that political will has a 
strong effect on ACAs’ resources, operational autonomy and efficient judicial system. 
A fundamental success factor for an effective ACA is the sufficiency of financial 
resource. The adequacy of budgetary allocation to ACAs is linked to the effectiveness 
of ACAs in fighting corruption (Quah, 2009). In addition, Quah (2015b) attributed the 
success of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) to the adequacy 
of funding from the government. Sufficient budgetary allocation is a precondition for 
the recruitment of adequate and competent personnel and the adoption of innovation 
(Hameed, Counsell, & Swift, 2012; Meagher, 2005).  Therefore, political will is a key 
factor in funding and the recruitment of competent workforce to enable the adoption of 
forensic accounting by ACAs. 
The powers of ACAs to adopt measures that ensure successful investigation and 
prosecution of corrupt practices is usually contained in the laws establishing these 
agencies (Ogbu, 2010). As such, ensuring the operational autonomy of ACAs leads to 
the adoption of modern approach in evidence gathering. Furthermore, the existence of 
a comprehensive law that guarantees the autonomy of ACAs and having knowledge 
of forensic accounting was found to enhance the effectiveness of CPIB in collecting 
relevant evidence and tracing ill-gotten assets (Quah, 2015b). Thus, comprehensive 
anti-corruption legislation may have a positive influence on the adoption of forensic 
accounting in fraud investigation process. 
Furthermore, Meagher (2005) argued that the effectiveness of ACAs depends on the 
efficient functioning of the country’s legal system. The argument is that corrupt elite 
hinders the efficiency of the judicial system by manipulating resource allocation to 
the judiciary and the appointment of key judicial officers. This weakens  the judicial 
system and affects the smooth prosecution of corruption cases. Moreover, this causes 
unnecessary delays in the court process allowing corruption to spread. In order 
to overcome this, an effective evidence gathering technique needs to be adopted to 
prosecute the corruption cases beyond reasonable doubt. This might call for a scientific 
approach to evidence gathering using forensic experts including forensic accountants 
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whose analytical knowledge and communication will convince the jurists on the charges 
brought against defendants. 
In this regards, the relevance of forensic accounting to successful anti-corruption fight 
is highlighted by Quah (2015b) and its effectiveness was reported in fraud investigation 
process in private sector (Bierstaker et al., 2006; Muthusamy, 2011). Despite the 
reported effectiveness, previous studies have reported the underutilization of forensic 
accounting in fraud investigation process (Bierstaker et al., 2006), attributing it to 
inadequate organizational resources and behavioral factors (Muthusamy, 2011). This 
highlights the importance of organizational resources on the adoption of forensic 
accounting in fraud investigation process. 
2.2 Influence of Organizational Factors on Structural Form ACAs
In the preceding section, the influence of contextual factors were highlighted by 
identifying the antecedent effect of political will on the sufficiency of funding, efficiency 
of the  judicial system, and operational autonomy of ACAs. These factors are believed 
to be critical in the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs. Equally, political will 
was found to affect the resourcing of ACAs especially financial and human resource 
that are essential for a successful anti-corruption fight. 
In line with this proposition, Meagher (2005) and Persson et al. (2013) have variously 
argued that the effectiveness of ACAs was dependent on the sufficiency of resources. 
Specifically, Meagher (2005) posits that the success or failure of ACAs is dependent 
on adequate number of personnel that are highly specialized. Therefore, having 
sufficient number of qualified staff is a precondition for the adoption of modern fraud 
detection tool for an enhanced anti-corruption fight. Previous studies have associated 
the adoption of innovation to organizational size (Chor, Wisdom, Olin, Hoagwood, & 
Horwitz, 2015; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). Organizational size, measured in terms 
of number of employees, is directly associated with specialization, professionalism, 
differentiation and slack resources (Damanpour, 1991; Vanacker, Collewaert, & Zahra, 
2016). Larger and complex organizations were found to adopt new ideas faster than 
smaller organizations (Kapoor, Dwivedi, & Williams, 2014; Rogers, 2003). Thus, 
there is apparent indication that sufficient number of personnel in an ACA leads to the 
adoption of forensic accounting in fraud investigation process. 
Size is also associated with managerial attitude (Vaccaro, Jansen, van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2012). The role played by top management, in any organization, is to provide 
direction in achieving organizational objectives (Vaccaro et al., 2012). In line with this, 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) proposed that organizational choices and performance are 
influenced by managerial background characteristics. Previous studies have reported 
the influence of top managerial background characteristic on the adoption of new ideas 
in public sector organizations (Damanpour & Schneider, 2006; Kimberly & Evanisko, 
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1981). Specifically, top management educational background, age and tenure of office 
have been used in predicting strategic decisions including the adoption of innovation 
(Hameed et al., 2012).  Therefore, top management background characteristics are said 
to influence the strategic decision to adopt forensic accounting by an ACA. 
It is believed that political will influences the adoption of forensic accounting by 
ACAs, by affecting the sufficiency of funding, enabling laws, organizational resources 
and managerial background characteristics. However, there appears to be inadequate 
studies that have examined the influence of these factors on the adoption of forensic 
accounting to explain the nature of their influences. This suggests the need for further 
in-depth studies to identify and describe these institutional and contingency factors 
affecting the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs. 
3.0 Proposed Framework 
Various theories have been used to explain organizational forms, structures and the 
adoption of innovation in enhancing organizational performance (Ahmadi, Nilashi, & 
Ibrahim, 2015; Ciganek, Haseman, & Ramamurthy, 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Donaldson, 2006; Rogers, 2003). A majority of these theories are concerned with how 
new ideas are created, accepted, diffused and legitimized (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Rogers, 2003). Some are concerned with internal capability to meet organizational 
objectives (Donaldson, 2006). Accordingly, two prominent theories have been used 
to explain organizational form, structure and performance. A rational organization 
structure is formed by adjusting its internal capability to external dynamics (Donaldson, 
2006).
According to the institutional perspective, organizational structure is influenced 
by external pressures exerted by the government, donor agencies and/or the need to 
replicate successful firms (Daddi, Testa, Frey, & Iraldo, 2016). According to DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), coercive pressures from the government or regulatory agencies, 
normative forces exerted by external integration and the need to imitate successful 
ACA may influence the adoption of advanced fraud investigation tool for survival and 
legitimacy (Volberda, van der Weerdt, Verwaal, Stienstra, & Verdu, 2012). In line with 
this postulation, political will, resource dependence, donor requirements, and external 
communication among ACAs may have strong influence on the adoption of forensic 
accounting by ACAs. 
Although external influences do encourage the adoption of novel ideas (Rogers, 2003), 
organizational factors may pose a challenge to the adoption of forensic accounting. 
The adoption of forensic accounting in fraud detection may partially be influenced by 
organizational size, professionalism, differentiation or top management background 
characteristics. Accordingly, organizations are conscious entities aiming to enhance 
performance by fitting their structure to their operational contexts (Donaldson, 2006) 
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thus, suggesting that both external and internal factors may contribute to the adoption 
of forensic accounting by ACAs.
Figure 1. Proposed Conceptual Framework for Adoption of Forensic Accounting by ACAs
4.0 Research Implication 
The increasing incidences of corrupt practices and the inability of ACAs to minimize 
the level of corruption have been associated with external influences and organizational 
contingencies. Although past studies have argued that the effectiveness of anti-
corruption fight depends on the degree of commitment exhibited by political leaders, 
little empirical efforts have been conducted to assess the existence of these factors and 
their influences on the structure of these ACAs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Theoretically, integrating institutional and contingency factors in identifying and 
explaining the influence of environmental and organizational factors on the adoption 
of forensic accounting by ACAs will contribute to the literature. In identifying these 
factors alone, this study adds to the insufficient literature on the adoption of forensic 
accounting, particularly by ACAs. Investigating the influences of these factors on the 
adoption of forensic accounting will further create an avenue for academic discussion 
thereby coming up with specific factors leading to the underutilization of forensic 
accounting in fraud investigation process.
However, considering the insufficiency of research works on the adoption of forensic 
accounting in fraud investigation process, in-depth research using multiple sources 
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current study, therefore, proposes the case study approach to inquiry, purposively 
selecting research subjects with appropriate knowledge of the relevance of forensic 
accounting and decision-making factors in ACAs. This will provide diverse views 
of probable factors responsible for the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs in 
developing countries. 
Public policies, especially anti-corruption, need to be dynamic. Therefore, identifying 
these factors will provide a guide to formulating anti-corruption policies and modifying 
existing policies to meet the modern need for effective anti-corruption strategies. 
Practically, identifying the relevance of political will and its influence on ACAs’ 
performance will minimize the level of corruption by ensuring adequate legal support, 
sufficient funding and operational autonomy to aid in the adoption of modern fraud 
investigation tools such as forensic accounting.
5.0 Conclusion 
       
Without doubt, an effective ACA is a necessity for economic development. Ensuring 
the effectiveness of these ACAs depends on the level of commitment, comprehensive 
anti-corruption policies and sufficient financial and human resources. Providing 
adequate funding has a strong impact on ACAs’ workforce and the adoption of forensic 
accounting in fraud investigation. Despite this proposition, little is known about the 
influences of these factors on the adoption of forensic accounting by ACAs. Therefore, 
addressing these limitations will enhance our understanding of the influences of these 
factors theoretically, and practically help in minimizing corruption in developing 
countries. 
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